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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SAFE AT HOME BASE? A LOOK AT THE MILITARY’S NEW
APPROACH TO DEALING WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS1

I. INTRODUCTION
As American soldiers returned home from Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan during the summer of 2002, disturbing reports began to come out
of Fort Bragg2 in North Carolina. In the space of six weeks, four women and
one man were murdered by their spouses.3 Two of the murdered women’s
husbands then committed suicide.4 The women who were killed were
attempting to get out of troubled marriages; their soldier husbands “refused to
let go.”5 These tragic deaths turned a much-needed spotlight on the way the
military handles domestic violence within its ranks.6 Sorely needed reforms
were already being discussed before the Fort Bragg deaths. It is hoped that this
tragedy will spur faster implementation of reforms that will bring increased
protections for all victims of domestic violence living in military communities.
This Comment will explore the occurrence of domestic violence in the
United States as a whole and efforts by the state and federal government to
deal with the problem. The Comment will then explore the military’s past

1. This Comment was originally conceived and written as an argument in favor of
expanding the protections of the full faith and credit and enforcement provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act to residents of military bases in recognition of the fact that a loophole in the
law led to the exclusion of federal enclave residents. The need for such an argument has been
obviated by the passage of the Armed Forces Domestic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-311, § 2(a),
116 Stat. 2455 (December 2, 2002) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.A. § 1561a (West Supp.
2003)). This Act will be discussed in detail, as will other efforts the military is making to better
address the problem of domestic violence within its ranks.
2. Fort Bragg, located near Fayetteville, North Carolina, is the world’s largest airborne
facility and one of the largest Army bases in the United States. See Fayetteville Area Convention
& Visitor’s Bureau, Military Installations, at http://www.visitfayettevillenc.com/bragg.htm (last
visited Nov. 14, 2003).
3. Niles Lathem, How GI Heroes Turned Homes into Killing Fields, N.Y. POST, Aug. 4,
2002, at 8. Two of the women were shot in the head, one woman was strangled, and one woman
was stabbed fifty times. Id. The man, an Army major, was shot by his civilian wife. Barbra
Bateman, How Will Fort Bragg Face the Murders?, N.Y. POST, Aug. 1, 2002, at 27.
4. Lathem, supra note 3, at 8.
5. Id.
6. See Ron Martz, Lawmakers Study Military Spouse Abuse: Fatal Violence Spurs Search
for Solutions, ATL. J.–CONST., Oct. 1, 2002, at A15.
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responses to domestic violence and the reasons the military’s efforts were
largely unaffected by previous changes in state and federal laws. Next, the
new steps being taken by the military in response to domestic violence in
military communities and the effect these changes should have on domestic
violence intervention and prevention will be explored. Finally, recent changes
in federal law that will have a substantial effect on the way the military handles
domestic violence will also be discussed.
Domestic violence is a persistent and widespread problem in American
society. The statistics are chilling. Estimates indicate that four million
American women are battered by their husbands or partners each year.7
Domestic violence accounts for more injuries to American women than the
injuries caused by muggings, stranger-to-stranger crimes, and occupational
hazards combined.8 An incident of domestic violence will occur at least once
in more than a quarter of all marriages.9 One husband in eight is physically
aggressive toward his wife at least one time a year.10 One in fourteen
Domestic violence
marriages involve severe and repeated violence.11
“accounts for thirty-one percent of all murders of women.”12 Women of all
races and economic classes experience domestic violence.13 “An estimated
fifty percent of all American women are battered at some time in their lives.”14

7. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women:
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 807-08 (1993). This
estimate may be conservative; the majority of “national estimates are obtained from surveys
which have typically excluded the very poor, those who do not speak English fluently, those
whose lives are especially chaotic, military families, and persons who are hospitalized, homeless,
institutionalized, or incarcerated.” Id. at 809.
8. G. Kristian Miccio, Male Violence—State Silence: These and Other Tragedies of the
20th Century, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 339, 343-44 (2002).
9. Klein & Orloff, supra note 7, at 808-09.
10. Id. at 809.
11. Id.
12. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1849 (2002). Epstein’s argument is that states have
gone so far in the direction of trying to aid the victim that the rights of alleged offenders are often
infringed. See id. at 1845-46.
13. Klein & Orloff, supra note 7, at 807. While men are sometimes victims of domestic
violence, 90-95% of reported domestic assault victims are women abused by their partners.
Russell P. Dobash, The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital Violence, 39 SOC. PROBS. 71, 74-75
(1992). For this reason, victims of domestic violence will be referred to as female throughout this
Comment.
14. Klein & Orloff, supra note 7, at 808.
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II. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE
CIVILIAN SECTOR
For centuries, the legal system condoned domestic violence.15 Physical
punishment of wives by husbands was explicitly legal in the United States well
into the nineteenth century.16 Even when such conduct was no longer
expressly legal, the states were unwilling to interfere with family affairs except
in cases of extreme violence.17 This attitude persisted until late in the
twentieth century.18 Spurred on by the efforts of victim advocates within the
battered women’s movement, reforms such as relaxed standards for
warrantless arrests, mandatory arrest statutes, increased aggressiveness in the
prosecution of domestic violence cases, and automatic issuance of no-contact
orders as a condition of pretrial release have become widespread in recent
decades.19 In addition to the increased response to domestic violence by the
states, Congress became involved in the struggle against domestic violence
when it passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)20 in 1994 and
amended the Gun Control Act of 196821 with the 1996 Lautenberg
Amendment,22 which gave the federal government the power to prosecute
certain types of domestic violence crimes.23
Currently, all states have civil protective order statutes. These statutes
provide basic tools that victims of domestic violence might utilize in their
efforts to leave the abusive relationship, including immediate ex parte
protection,24 child support, temporary child custody, a safe means of
exchanging children for scheduled visits with the non-custodial parent, and
stay-away provisions.25 A full order of protection is generally valid for one to
three years and may be renewed if a need for continued protection is

15. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 1850.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1850-51.
18. Id. at 1851.
19. Id. at 1853-58.
20. Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, § 40001, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
21. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 921–928 (2000)).
22. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009–371 (1996) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000)). The Violence Against Women Act was originally passed in 1994 and
amended by Congress in 2000.
23. See James M. Peters, Federal Domestic Violence Laws–2001, ADVOC. (Idaho), Aug.
2001, at 15.
24. An ex parte order of protection is granted solely on the basis of the victim’s petition and
grants protection until a full hearing is held. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 455.035 (2000).
25. Epstein, supra note 12, at 1858-59.
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demonstrated.26 Every state has made the violation of a protective order a
criminal offense.27
Several provisions within the VAWA have contributed to the effectiveness
of protective orders by enabling women to escape violent intimate partners and
not just violent spouses. Under the VAWA, an “intimate partner” is a spouse,
former spouse, a past or present cohabitant (if the relationship resembled a
marriage), parents who have a child in common, and other persons similarly
situated to spouses (including same-sex partners) if they are protected by the
domestic or family violence laws of the state or reservation where the victim
resides or was injured.28
It is now a federal crime to travel across state lines or into or out of tribal
lands with the specific intent to violate a valid order of protection.29 The
VAWA also provides that valid protective orders issued by a state court or
Native American tribe be accorded full faith and credit by the courts of other
states or tribes and enforced as the state or tribe would enforce its own orders,
as long as certain criteria are met.30 Permanent, temporary or ex parte orders
can satisfy full faith and credit requirements.31 To qualify for full faith and
credit, an order must be issued by a court that has jurisdiction over the parties
and must comport with due process requirements in that the defendant must
have had reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard.32 A mutual order
of protection33 will not qualify for full faith and credit if “(a) the original
respondent did not file a cross or counter petition seeking a protective order or
(b) if such a cross or counter petition was filed, but the court did not make
specific findings that each party was entitled to such an order.”34 Mutual or
consent orders of protection are often issued without a hearing or a specific
finding of abuse, and because of this procedure, they do not fulfill the
VAWA’s requirement of reasonable notice or opportunity to be heard
necessary to qualify for recognition of the orders in other jurisdictions.

26. Id. at 1859-60.
27. Id. at 1860.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2266 (2000).
29. Id. § 2262(a)(1).
30. Id. § 2265(a).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 2265(b).
33. Under a mutual order of protection, both parties are subject to the terms of the order.
Mutual orders are also known as consent orders. See Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit:
Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29
FAM. L.Q. 253, 266-68 (1995) (discussing mutual protection orders).
34. Peters, supra note 23, at 18.
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III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE MILITARY
A.

History and Overview of Treatment of Domestic Violence in the Military

While state and federal laws, along with community-based advocacy and
assistance programs, have combined to give victims of domestic violence in
the civilian sector many resources to end abusive relationships more safely,
victims of domestic violence within the military have been largely excluded
from the purview of these laws. The Violence Against Women Act explicitly
applies to states and Native American lands, but it does not mention military
installations, which are often areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction. To
explain why efforts to prevent and respond effectively to domestic violence in
the military have lagged behind similar efforts in the civilian sector, a brief
discussion of the deference that Congress and the courts have traditionally
shown the military and military base commanders is necessary.
Congress has passed legislation that gives military base commanders broad
discretion, and the courts have been unwilling to interfere in decisions made
within the military in the exercise of that discretion. An example of such
discretion includes the right to exclude specific individuals from the base.35
Whom to exclude is left largely to the commander, and the courts will not
question or reverse the commander’s decision unless the denial of access is
found to be “patently arbitrary or discriminatory.”36 The rationale for this
broad authority is that it is the commander’s “duty to maintain the order,
security, and discipline necessary to military operations.”37 This power has
been exercised to exclude civilians working on military bases without allowing
the worker the opportunity for a hearing or a chance to counter the charges (or
even to know specifically what they were),38 and to prohibit the door-to-door
distribution of printed advertising material because it interfered with the ability
of the Civilian Enterprise Newspaper (CEN)39 to attract advertisers.40 The

35. 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (2000).
36. United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 984.
37. United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973).
38. See Cafeteria and Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961)
(summarily revoking the identification badge and security clearance of worker because of
unspecified security concerns did not violate the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment or the
worker’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
39. A CEN is a civilian-run publication that publishes only content prepared by the public
affairs department of the base. See Shopco Dist. Co. v. Commanding Gen. of Marine Corps Base,
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 885 F.2d 167, 169 (4th Cir. 1989). The CEN is the primary
medium used by the commander to communicate with base personnel. Id.
40. See id. at 172 (noting that military bases have traditionally been considered a nonpublic
forum, and the base commander could prohibit content neutral door-to-door distributions in
residential areas of the base to protect the monopoly of the CEN without violating the First
Amendment).
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base commander also has the discretion to declare a base either open or closed
to the public and to exclude groups or specific individuals from the base, a
right that has been exercised through the use of so-called “bar letters” to ban
protesters and political activists.41 Interestingly, the United States Department
of Defense (DoD) has indicated some reservations about using this authority to
ban civilian domestic violence offenders from the base.42
Given this broad authority, it is not surprising that the military had been
left largely untouched by efforts to effectively combat domestic violence.
Despite this deference,43 the murders at Fort Bragg reinforced an already
apparent need for a stronger approach to domestic violence in military
communities.44
Military families are not immune to domestic violence. Some studies
indicate that the domestic violence rate in the military is five times as high as
that of the civilian population, although other studies find the rates to be
roughly equivalent.45 Whatever the rate, the realities of military life can make
it extremely difficult for victims of domestic violence to get the services they

41. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 681-82 (1985) (holding a nine-year-old bar
letter still valid to prevent recipient from attending military open house); United States v.
LaValley, 957 F.2d 1309, 1313 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the granting of an easement to the
state government for use as a road did not give the recipient of a bar letter the right to be on the
land).
42. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THIRD YEAR REP.
2003, at 155, available at www.dtic.mil/domesticviolence/reports/DV_RPT3.PDF [hereinafter
DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE]. The Task Force had recommended such
action; the DoD agreed only to study the issue. Id.
43. The Supreme Court has held that “judicial deference . . . is at its apogee when legislative
action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and
regulations for their governance is challenged.” Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).
Recurrent evidence of this high degree of judicial deference to the military can been seen in the
courts’ treatment of the military’s “don’t ask/don’t tell” policy regarding homosexuals. 10 U.S.C.
§ 654(b)(2) (2000). Courts have subjected the policy only to rational basis review and have
upheld the status/conduct distinction that allows a service member to be removed from the
military for such “conduct” as making a mere statement of homosexual identity. See Able v.
United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d. Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126,
1128 (9th Cir. 1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 948; Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Steffan v. Perry, 41
F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc). The reason for such deference is the view that lifeappointed federal judges are not suited to make military decisions or “exercise military
authority.” Able, 155 F.3d at 634.
44. Martz, supra note 6.
45. Allen G. Breed, Does Army Breed Domestic Violence? Government to Probe Slayings at
Fort Bragg, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Sept. 3-4, 2002, at A7. There are currently
proposals in place to study the issue of domestic violence in the military. For information about
recommended areas of specific research, see DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
supra note 42, at 154.
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need.46 Domestic abuse survivor and Harvard Law School graduate Sarah M.
Buel cites one partner in an abusive relationship being in the military as an
obstacle for the other partner to leave. She wrote:
If the victim or the perpetrator is in the military, an effective intervention is
largely dependent on the commander’s response, regardless of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), its provisions for a military protective
order, and the availability of assistance from the Family Advocacy Programs.
Many commanders believe that it is more important to salvage the soldier’s
military career than to ensure the victim’s safety. Other victims are unaware
that they are entitled to a short-term stipend if they report the abuse and lose
the soldier’s financial support as a result.47

The spousal killings at Fort Bragg in the summer of 2002 have drawn
attention to the ineffective way the military has handled domestic violence.48
Critics, including a congressional fact-finding group, have called attention to
the inadequacy of the services available on military bases and the lack of
cooperation with civilian law enforcement and independent advocacy and
support programs.49 Critics also point to the problems presented by the
unwillingness of soldiers to seek outside counseling or assistance because of
the lack of privacy in the military and the detrimental effect a history of mental
health or domestic problems can have on a soldier’s career.50 “Advocates who
track domestic violence in the military say that although the Pentagon claims it
has a zero-tolerance policy, that policy is applied inconsistently across the
services, and many bases do not have effective programs for victims.”51 An
examination of the military’s Family Advocacy Program (FAP) will show how
woefully far the military had lagged behind the rest of the country in terms of
its response to domestic violence.
The FAP procedures for dealing with domestic violence in the military
when the killings occurred at Fort Bragg became effective in 1992.52 DoD
Directive 6400.1 provides that when an alleged act of abuse occurs, the FAP
officer of the base must be informed and has the responsibility for assuring that
46. Advocacy groups have identified such factors as frequent and lengthy separations,
infidelity, low pay, and the stresses associated with combat as factors that can trigger situations
that lead to the inappropriate response of domestic violence. See T. Trent Gegax et al., Death in
the Ranks at Fort Bragg, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 2002, at 30.
47. Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay, COLO.
LAWYER, Oct. 1999, at 19, 24 (footnotes omitted).
47
See Marianne Szegedy-Maszak, Death at Fort Bragg, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 12,
2002, at 44.
48
Martz, supra note 6.
50. Id.
51. Moni Basu, Fort Bragg Killings Change Army’s Attitude on Stress, ATL. J.–CONST.,
Aug. 30, 2002, at A1.
52. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 6400.1: FAMILY ADVOCACY PROGRAM § 8, at
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/dir2.html (June 23, 1992) [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE].
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the victim receives appropriate medical treatment, that the commanding officer
and military law enforcement and investigative bodies are properly notified,
and that the rights of the alleged abuser are properly observed.53 Each case is
to be reviewed by a Case Review Committee (CRC).54 The CRC has
responsibility for reviewing the information available and making a
determination of whether the alleged abuse is “substantiated,” “suspected,” or
“unsubstantiated.”55 The CRC makes recommendations to the commanding
officer about placement of a service member in a treatment program and, if
treatment is undertaken, keeps the commander informed of progress made.56
To ensure timeliness, commanders, under locally-decided guidelines, are to
receive full information on the case in order to make a disposition.57 Factors to
be considered in this decision include the service member’s performance in the
military and the potential for future service, prognosis for treatment of the
abusive behavior as determined by a clinician with experience in diagnosis and
treatment, the extent to which the alleged abuser acknowledges accountability
for the behavior and indicates a desire to be treated for it, and other factors
deemed important by the commander.58
While the DoD Directive covering domestic violence purports to express
concern for the victim, the first factor to be considered by the commanding
officer is the service member’s past performance and whether or not the soldier
can be of further use to the military.59 Also, the DoD Directive only addresses
spousal abuse situations in which the abuser is the soldier; it does not appear to
contemplate a situation in which a service member is abused by a civilian
spouse living on the base, although such abuse surely occurs.60 Another
troubling aspect of DoD Directive 6400.1 is that while it is purportedly the
policy of the DoD to cooperate with civilian authorities in responding to

53. Id. § 6.1.
54. Id. § 6.2. The Domestic Violence Task Force has suggested that the CRC be replaced
with a Domestic Violence Assessment and Intervention Team in cases of spousal abuse. The
DoD has not yet taken a position on the issue. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
supra note 42, at 115-16, 167.
55. DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 52, § 6.2. Substantiated cases are those where a
preponderance of the information reviewed supports a finding that abuse has occurred. Id. §
E2.1.2.1. Suspect cases are those that require further investigation, although a case cannot be in
this category and be investigated for more than twelve weeks. Id. § E2.1.2.2. An unsubstantiated
claim is one where the information does not support a finding of abuse. Id. § E2.1.2.3. A family
in this category is deemed not to require advocacy services. Id.
56. Id. § 6.2.
57. Id. § 6.3.
58. DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 52, at §§ 6.3.3-6.3.4.
59. Id. § 6.3.1.
60. See Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (Mass. 1989) (service woman abused by civilian
spouse).
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incidents of domestic violence,61 the base commander, in exercising his
discretion under Section 6, is not required to involve the civilian authorities at
all.62 The 1992 version of DoD Directive 6400.1 did not adequately emphasize
the criminality of some domestic violence, nor did it stress the military’s
intolerance for such conduct and the need to hold offenders accountable. The
provisions for assistance to the victim were also weak.
Victim’s advocacy groups present for a congressional subcommittee
meeting following the murders at Fort Bragg said: “[T]he military’s internal
domestic-abuse prevention program, the largest in the world, does not work for
a variety of reasons.”63 Tyniesse Harrison, executive director of the Breast
Cancer Resource Center of Fayetteville64 and a victim’s advocate, said that a
major problem is that often when complaints are made to a commander, no
action is taken because the commander is also abusive.65 Another problem is
that the military’s desire to handle the problem internally may prevent them
from using resources available in the community. “Civilian agencies could
provide much-needed expertise and resources in addition to the confidentiality
victims seek when they file complaints against abusive spouses, something that
is not available to them on post if they ask for help . . . .”66 Lack of
responsiveness on the part of base commanders and a lack of confidentiality
prevented many victims from seeking assistance.
B.

Current Efforts to Address Domestic Violence in the Military

The military knew that domestic violence within its ranks was a serious
problem long before the deaths at Fort Bragg. In February 2001, the Defense
Task Force on Domestic Violence (Task Force)67 issued an initial report to the

61. Id. § 4.6.
62. Id. § 6.1. Civilian agencies and state law enforcement mechanisms and procedures,
including civil protective orders, must and will play a much larger role in responding to military
domestic violence in the future. See infra Part V.
63. Martz, supra note 6.
64. Fayetteville, N.C., is the town nearest Fort Bragg.
65. Martz, supra note 6.
66. Id.
67. The Task Force was created by Congress in 2000 to address the problem of domestic
violence in the military. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999). The Task Force was to last three years and was directed to issue
annual reports containing recommendations for improving the military’s response to domestic
violence. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at v. The second
report dealt extensively with issues of cross-cultural sensitivity and special problems that can
arise when domestic violence occurs in military families stationed overseas. Id. at 4. These
issues are beyond the scope of this Comment.
The Task Force issued its final report in 2003. The DoD has not issued a response to
many of the recommendations made in this final report. For a comprehensive compilation of the
Task Force reports and DoD responses, see DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
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United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. The initial report
acknowledged that the military’s prevention “efforts have not always kept
victims safe or held batterers accountable and stopped the violence.”68 In its
initial report and in its two subsequent reports, the Task Force recommended
that several steps be taken to address many problems, both as to the military’s
domestic violence prevention efforts and its response to domestic violence.69
The third and final report, issued in 2003, contains a listing of the nearly 200
Task Force recommendations, along with the DoD’s response to the
recommendations and a status report showing whether any action has been
taken on the recommendations.70
The Task Force recommended several changes to the FAP guidelines
dealing with domestic violence. The Task Force recognized the inadequacy of
base programs and recommended that base and regional commanders be
required to seek Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with local communities
to address ways of responding to violence.71 The DoD agreed with this
recommendation and agreed to amend DoD Directive 6400.1 accordingly.72
The implementation of this and similar recommendations is an important shift
away from the traditional military policy of addressing domestic violence
problems internally.73 Access to services away from the military base is an
important way to ensure confidentiality, something of concern to both victims

COMPILATION OF REPORTS: 2001–2003 (2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/
domesticviolence/reports/Start.pdf.
68. Memorandum from the United States Department of Defense to Secretaries of the
Military Departments in Letter from Jack Klimp and Deborah Tucker, Co-Chairs of the Defense
Task Force on Domestic Violence, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, United States
Department of Defense (Feb. 28, 2001), available at http://www.dtic.mil/domesticviolence. The
letter was included as an introduction for the Secretary of Defense when he was forwarded the
Initial Report of the Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence upon its completion, and it is
currently incorporated into the report.
69. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at vi. The Task Force
recommended improvement in several key areas: (1) programs to ensure the safety of victims; (2)
emphasis on holding the offender accountable; (3) creation of a climate that effectively prevents
domestic violence; (4) “coordination and collaboration among all military organizations with
responsibility or jurisdiction with respect to domestic violence;” (5) cooperation among civilian
and military communities regarding domestic violence issues; (6) topics that should be priorities
for research; (7) collection of data regarding domestic violence and a system for managing and
tracking cases; (8) establishing a curriculum and providing training to commanding officers; (9)
preventing and responding to domestic violence on overseas military bases; (10) other issues
deemed by the Task Force to relate to domestic violence in the military. Id.
70. See id. at 148-69.
71. Id. at 148. In response to a recommendation from the Task Force, the DoD agreed that
DoD Directive 6400.1 would be amended so that the MOUs with civilian agencies would include
a means of conducting formal and informal fatality reviews. Id. at 151.
72. Id.
73. Martz, supra note 6.
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and offenders. A victim may also choose to seek assistance off of the military
base to avoid the military’s complex chain-of-command procedures.
The DoD, again in accordance with a Task Force recommendation, has
agreed to amend DoD Directive 6400.1 with regard to its provisions for the
The Task Force
issuance of military protective orders (MPOs).74
recommended five changes in the MPO structure: (1) the use of a standard
MPO throughout the military; (2) a requirement that the MPO be in writing;
(3) a requirement that the victim receive a copy of the MPO within 24 hours;
(4) establishment of a centralized system to record and track MPOs; and (5) a
requirement that copies of the MPO be provided to base Military Police (MP)
personnel and the FAP.75 The DoD also agreed to amend DoD Directive
6400.1 to comport with each recommendation, with the exception of the fourth
issue regarding a centralized tracking system, which is being studied further.76
These changes make it much more likely that, in the event an MPO is issued,
the appropriate parties will be informed so that the MPO can be effectively
enforced. A standard written MPO will also help to ensure equal treatment
among domestic violence offenders against whom an MPO is issued. Most
importantly, issuing a copy of the MPO to the victim should alert the victim
that her complaint has been taken seriously and that steps will be taken to
properly enforce the order and protect her from her abuser should the offender
violate the MPO.77
Another important addition to DoD Directive 6400.1 is the Task Force’s
recommendation that commanding officers receive domestic violence training
within ninety days of being appointed, and then annually thereafter.78 The
DoD has agreed to amend DoD Directive 6400.1 to require such training and
to further provide training for senior non-commissioned officers according to a
The Task Force has also provided detailed
standardized program.79
information describing the topics that should be encompassed by the training.80
Educating commanding officers about domestic violence is extremely
important because the commander’s response often determines whether or not

74. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 149.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Given the new law regarding enforcement of civil protective orders on military
bases, the Task Force has also recommended that the DoD set standard enforcement policies for
civilian criminal warrants and civil protective orders on military bases. Id. at 157. The DoD has
agreed to achieve this objective through training. Id.
78. Id. at 149.
79. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 149.
80. Id.
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the victim receives the appropriate assistance and whether the offender will be
held accountable.81
The Task Force recommended the following changes to the way the
military law enforcement structure responds to domestic violence, including:
(1) the development of an initial domestic violence training program for the
military police; (2) ensuring domestic violence training for local MP patrollers;
(3) the creation of mobile training units; (4) development of a list of state-ofthe-art domestic violence equipment, and (5) initiation of evidence-based
training for staff judge advocates.82 The DoD has agreed to amend DoD
Directive 6400.1 to include the first two recommendations, but it agreed only
to study further the final three recommendations.83 Because law enforcement
intervention often places the victim in more danger as the abuser feels a loss of
control, proper domestic violence training for personnel in the military
criminal justice system is critical to ensuring victim safety.84
The Task Force made further recommendations meant to reflect the
criminal nature of many incidents of domestic violence.
Suggested
amendments to the DoD Directive regarding the criminality of such violence
included: (1) investigating each incident of domestic violence to determine
whether a crime has been committed; (2) training members of law
enforcement, command, and the legal department to collaborate when making
a determination regarding whether a crime has been committed, and (3)
developing guidelines for commanding officers in determining whether an
incident of domestic violence is substantiated.85 The DoD agreed with the first
recommendation with regard to first responders.86 DoD Directive 6400.1 will
be amended to include the training recommendations included in the second
recommendation, and the third recommendation will be implemented in a
manner that is consistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the

81. Buel, supra note 47, at 24. Other changes to be discussed infra make the commander’s
role less critical. Nevertheless, it is imperative that military base commanders are appropriately
educated about the need to prevent domestic violence in military communities.
82. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 149. The Task Force
also recommends domestic violence training for the chaplainry; the DoD agreed to amend the
DoD Directive accordingly and a signed memorandum regarding this policy was issued by the
DoD on Nov. 19, 2001. Id. at 150. Likewise, the DoD concurred with Task Force
recommendations regarding the domestic violence training of military healthcare workers and
agreed to amend the DoD Directive to provide for such training. Id.
83. Id.
84. See generally Virginia E. Hench, When Less is More—Can Reducing Penalties Reduce
Household Violence?, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 37 (1997) (discussing the risk of increased violence
because of police involvement and the need for police to be properly trained to respond to
domestic violence incidents).
85. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 151.
86. Id.
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Manual for Courts-Martial.87 The importance of conveying the message that
domestic violence is criminal conduct that will not be allowed on military
bases cannot be overemphasized. Following the deaths at Fort Bragg, the
message from the highest levels of military command should be that domestic
abusers will be punished for their criminal acts.88 Having established
guidelines for commanders will also help to ensure a uniform response to
domestic violence in military communities.
Victim advocates have identified the lack of confidentiality as one of the
major problems in obtaining help within the military.89 The Task Force has
also recognized the lack of confidentiality as an area of concern,
recommending that the DoD: (1) work with the Task Force to expand the
National Domestic Violence Hotline and pilot a program with the Department
of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice to make
confidential community services available, and (2) explore other options for
creating a means of providing services to victims confidentially.90 These
recommendations were approved, and a template is now being created for the
National Domestic Violence Hotline to be used for military-related calls.91
Increased confidentiality should encourage more victims and more offenders to
seek help.
The reports issued by the Task Force also include several
recommendations aimed at ensuring that residents of military bases are aware
of the military’s position on domestic violence and the resources that are
available to residents, such as: (1) inclusion of information about domestic
violence in the information packet given to new residents; (2) issuance of a
statement on victim safety from the Secretary of Defense; (3) issuance of
specific information about services offered by FAP, and (4) issuance of
specific information on local community-based domestic violence services and
the National Domestic Violence Hotline.92 The DoD has signaled its
agreement with these proposals and is committed to implementing them.93
87. Id. The Task Force also recommended that the DoD establish a policy regarding which
party should be removed from military housing following an incident of domestic violence and a
policy to ensure that first responders are trained to identify a primary aggressor. Id. at 152. The
DoD agreed to amend DoD Directive 6400.1 to include a removal policy but disagreed that first
responders should be trained to identify a primary aggressor. Id. Because the Task Force
believes such identification enhances the victim’s safety, the Task Force has requested that the
DoD reconsider the matter. Id.
88. Bateman, supra note 3.
89. Martz, supra note 6.
90. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 153.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The DoD further agreed that in cases where a service member with an open domestic
violence case is to be transferred to another base, the commander of the base gaining the service
member should be notified that a case is pending and the FAP officer at the gaining base should
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Educating residents of the military base is a critical part of the process of
fighting domestic violence. A woman in the midst of an abusive situation is in
crisis. In seeking help, she may not know about the full range of assistance
options available to her, or she may not be aware that help is available at all.
Making information about available resources part of the information families
are given upon arrival will enable the woman to review her options and make
decisions about how to deal with her situation before an emergency arises.
The three Task Force reports include several recommendations designed to
ensure the safety of the victim, something the previous DoD Directive had not
emphasized.
Among these recommendations are the following: (1)
development of safety plan policies for the armed services; (2) adoption of a
safety plan prepared by the Task Force; (3) adoption of a tool for assessing risk
prepared by the Task Force, and (4) ensuring that victim advocates are
available to assist victims in risk assessment and safety planning.94 The DoD
agreed with the first two recommendations and agreed to study the third and
fourth recommendations for possible implementation.95 Completion of a risk
assessment and the preparation of a safety plan are vital means of helping a
victim decide on a course of action. If she decides to attempt to leave the
abusive relationship, a risk assessment can help ascertain the level of danger
she is currently in and how that level may change if and when her partner
becomes aware that she is planning to leave. A safety plan can help the victim
prepare to leave safely, but a safety plan is also necessary for the partner who
chooses to remain in the relationship because safety plans typically include an
emergency plan for quickly getting out of sudden violent situations. The
military must provide these resources if its domestic violence victim assistance
provisions is to be successful.
Finally, the Task Force made several proposals to educate the military
community about domestic violence, including: (1) collaboration with agencies
experienced with domestic violence prevention to develop a continuous
awareness campaign; (2) emphasis on non-tolerance of domestic violence by
senior leadership; (3) inclusion of domestic violence education in schools for
officers and enlistees; (4) inclusion of domestic violence education as a part of
local training; (5) targeting of domestic violence education to grades E1–E4;
(6) highlighting the need to reach spouses who reside off the base; (7)
incorporation of domestic violence education in dependent schools; and (8)
provision of diversity education for members overseas.96 The DoD agreed

inform the commander of available services. Id. at 156. The DoD is also of the opinion that
transfer should be delayed if the domestic violence case had opened within 60 days of the
transfer. Id.
94. Id. at 162.
95. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 162.
96. Id. at 159.
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with these recommendations, although it indicated that proposal (7) required
more study.97 This plan of raising awareness about domestic violence is much
more comprehensive than anything the military has tried previously.
Heightened awareness of the problem should result in some prevention and in
more people within the military community coming forward to receive needed
assistance.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
IN THE MILITARY
While the VAWA initially had little or no impact on the response to
domestic violence in the military, another piece of legislation meant to address
domestic violence in the civilian sector did have an impact (albeit uncertain)
on the way the military handled domestic violence before the current sweeping
changes. Around the same time the VAWA was enacted, Congress expanded
the Gun Control Act of 1968 through legislation known as the Lautenberg
Amendment98 “to include domestic violence-related crimes.”99 The Act now
prohibits a person who is subject to a protective order from possessing
firearms, so long as the order was issued after the respondent had reasonable
notice and the opportunity to be heard, and the issuing court specifically found
that the respondent threatens the petitioner’s physical safety.100 The Gun
Control Act also makes it unlawful to knowingly transfer a firearm to a person
who is subject to a valid protective order.101
It is now illegal for a person to possess a firearm after being convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.102 The prohibition is operative even
for domestic violence convictions that occurred before the Lautenberg
Amendment’s effective date of September 30, 1996;103 however, the
prohibition only applies if an element of the misdemeanor was the threatened
use of a deadly weapon or the use or attempted use of physical force.104 The
prohibition will not be triggered unless the statute under which the defendant
was convicted uses the appropriate language—the use of violence by itself is
not enough.105 “A conviction for a misdemeanor violation of a protection
order will not qualify, therefore, even if the act was violent, unless the statute
requires the use or attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of a
97. Id.
98. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009–371 (1996) (codified as amended in 18
U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266 (2000)).
99. Peters, supra note 23, at 15.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000).
101. Id. at § 922(d)(8).
102. Id. at § 922(g)(9).
103. Peters, supra note 23, at 17.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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deadly weapon.”106 It is also illegal to make a knowing transfer of a firearm to
someone who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence.107 Persons who buy firearms are now required to make a statement
that they have not been convicted of any misdemeanor domestic violence
crimes.108 This legislation affects the military because § 922(d)(9) (transfers of
firearms to persons with misdemeanor domestic violence convictions) and §
922(g)(9) (possession of firearms by persons who have been convicted of a
domestic violence misdemeanor) are not subject to the official use
exemption.109 “This means that law enforcement officers or military personnel
who have been convicted of a qualifying domestic violence misdemeanor
cannot lawfully possess or receive firearms for any purpose, including the
performance of official duties.”110 The inability to use or possess a firearm for
any purpose is therefore, at least theoretically, career-ending for any service
member who is convicted of a misdemeanor domestic violence crime.111
Lack of clear enforcement guidelines has left the application of the
Lautenberg Amendment to service members inconsistent and unsettled.112 The
DoD has not issued guidance beyond those policies that were announced when
the Lautenberg Amendment was first passed.113
Under the current
implementation scheme, unit commanders are responsible for determining
which service members are affected by the Lautenberg Amendment and
reassigning those service members to positions that do not require the use of
firearms.114 Because of the military’s lack of a centralized database of persons
who have been convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors, making these
determinations is a very time-consuming task for the commander.115 When
there is cause for a commander to believe that a service member has been
convicted of a misdemeanor of domestic violence, the commander must pass
all available information on to the military’s local legal department.116 The
local legal department is subject to the laws of the state in which it is
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(9) (2000).
See Peters, supra note 23, at 17.
See 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2000).
Peters, supra note 23, at 18.
See, e.g., Jacey Eckhart, When War Between Spouses Hits Home, VIRGINIAN–PILOT &
LEDGER–STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Aug. 10, 2002, at E1 (arguing that “[i]t is more likely that the
consequences for reporting domestic abuse are higher for the military than for civilians” because
“[a] conviction for domestic abuse means the end of the career”).
112. Jessica A. Golden, Examining the Lautenberg Amendment in the Civilian and Military
Contexts: Congressional Overreaching, Statutory Vagueness, Ex Post Facto Violations, and
Implementational Flaws, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 427, 461-62 (2001).
113. Id. at 462.
114. Id. at 460.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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located.117 The legal department then must make a case-by-case determination
of “whether the soldier had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence under state law, and whether the soldier had knowingly and
intelligently waived a jury trial.”118 As a result of the difficulties in identifying
service members who are technically subject to the Lautenberg Amendment,
the number of service members who have been discharged as a result of
misdemeanor domestic violence convictions is very low, and “military
personnel are being allowed to retain their weapons until they are discharged
or separated from military service.”119 The military may also be avoiding
losses in recruitment caused by the Lautenberg Amendment by issuing moral
waivers120 to individuals who have been convicted of domestic violence crimes
and other misdemeanors and felonies, essentially doing an end-run around the
policy underlying the Lautenberg Amendment.121 “More guidance must be
given before the Lautenberg Amendment can be effectively applied, or achieve
its intended purpose of reducing domestic violence in the military.”122
Opponents of the Lautenberg Amendment have also argued that the
Amendment is flawed because it allows service members convicted of
domestic violence felonies to keep their firearms (and presumably remain in
the military) while preventing service members who have misdemeanor
domestic violence convictions from carrying weapons in performance of their
military duties.123 However, there is an alternative interpretation to the
congressional purpose behind the Lautenberg Amendment:
The majority of domestic violence charges and prosecutions are
misdemeanors, but the police and military only screen those with felony
convictions. Given this situation, it is reasonable that Congress recognized the
danger of armed police and military personnel with domestic violence
misdemeanor convictions. Congress merely filled a gap by blocking those
with domestic violence misdemeanor convictions in these areas of employment
from access to guns as was already policy for domestic violence felonies.124

117. Golden, supra note 112, at 460.
118. Id. at 460-61.
119. Id. at 462.
120. Moral waivers would allow service members to be admitted to or remain in positions
that allow them to possess a firearm despite a qualifying conviction under the Lautenberg
Amendment. The DoD has indicated its willingness to ensure that such waivers are granted only
in appropriate circumstances. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at
151.
121. Golden, supra note 112, at 462.
122. Id. at 463.
123. Captain E. John Gregory, The Lautenberg Amendment: Gun Control in the U.S. Army,
ARMY LAW., Oct. 2000, at 3, 13-14.
124. Alison J. Nathan, Note, At the Intersection of Domestic Violence and Guns: The Public
Interest Exception and the Lautenberg Amendment, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 852 (2000).
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Another challenge to the Lautenberg Amendment is that the alleged
disparate treatment of a service member convicted of a domestic violence
felony and a service member convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor
runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.125
Opponents recognize, however, that courts have almost uniformly applied
rational basis review, the lowest level of scrutiny, to cases arising under the
Lautenberg Amendment.126 Under this low level of scrutiny, “a law will be
sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if
the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if
the rationale for it seems tenuous.”127 The Lautenberg Amendment satisfies
this standard because:
The rational basis for the Amendment lies in Congress’s attempt to mend the
loophole that has allowed so many violent felons to plea-bargain down to
misdemeanors. Prior to the Lautenberg Amendment, felons who successfully
plead down to misdemeanors evaded the Gun Control Act’s ban on gun
possession by convicted felons. The Lautenberg Amendment strives to
prevent this evasion and to further the government’s goal of reducing gunrelated domestic violence nationwide.128

The Lautenberg Amendment also satisfies rational basis review because there
is no indication of intentional discrimination.129
It has been argued that the Lautenberg Amendment has a negative impact
on military readiness because of the burden that implementation of the
Amendment places on individual base commanders.130 The same argument
could presumably be made about the “burden” of enforcing protective orders
issued by state courts on military bases.131 This complaint is not surprising,
given the deference that is typically shown to the military and military base
commanders by both Congress and the courts.
Whatever the perceived drawbacks of the Lautenberg Amendment, the
military is now committed to finding a way to implement its provisions
successfully. The Task Force has recommended that the DoD: (1) conduct an
awareness campaign about the Lautenberg Amendment, and (2) require further
education about the Lautenberg Amendment on an annual basis.132 The DoD
has signaled its agreement with these recommendations and its intention to
125. Gregory, supra note 123, at 14. See also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike”).
126. Golden, supra note 112, at 452.
127. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
128. Golden, supra note 112, at 453-54.
129. Nathan, supra note 124, at 852.
130. See Gregory, supra note 123, at 16.
131. See discussion infra Part VI.
132. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 150.
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amend DoD Directive 6400.1 accordingly.133 In addition to the obvious
benefits of keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic violence offenders,
clarification of the impact of the Lautenberg Amendment and a commitment to
follow its requirements is an important step in the military’s plan to hold
offenders accountable for their actions and to ensure that military offenders are
treated equally within the military’s criminal justice system.134
V. NEW CIVIL ORDER OF PROTECTION OPTIONS FOR MILITARY VICTIMS OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A civil order of protection is an important tool for victims attempting to
leave an abusive relationship and avoid further violence. The VAWA
recognized this by making it a federal crime to cross state lines with the intent
to violate a valid protective order,135 and by ensuring that an order of
protection that was issued by a court with jurisdiction over the parties and that
comported with due process requirements, could be enforced in other
jurisdictions.136 Because MPOs were often issued without the respondent
having the benefit of a hearing, such orders did not qualify for full faith and
credit. Also, because military bases are areas subject to some level of federal
jurisdiction, courts had been unsure regarding jurisdiction to issue protective
orders to residents of such bases. Uncertainty about the extent of this federal
jurisdiction deterred state courts and law enforcement from getting involved in
domestic violence situations on military bases. State court judges, wary of
overstepping jurisdictional boundaries, were reluctant to issue a protective
order to a resident of a military base. The reluctance of the state to get
involved with domestic violence on military bases also extended to the civilian
police because of uncertainty about “authority, obligations, and liability.”137
Because this confusion about jurisdiction contributed to the belief that the
VAWA protections did not extend to residents of military bases and to the fact
that courts and local law enforcement agencies were seemingly reluctant to
give protection to victims of domestic violence in military communities, it is
useful to look at how federal enclave jurisdiction came about and how it has
been viewed by the courts.

133. Id.
134. The DoD, pursuant to a Task Force recommendation, has agreed to issue final guidance
on the Lautenberg Amendment, including discharges under the Amendment. Id. at 151.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1) (2000).
136. Id. at § 2265(a). Because due process includes notice and the opportunity to be heard,
many MPOs issued under the 1992 version of the DoD Directive did not meet full faith and credit
requirements. See infra notes 29–34 and accompanying text.
137. Major Stephen E. Castlen & Lieutenant Colonel Gregory O. Block, Exclusive Federal
Legislative Jurisdiction: Get Rid of It!, 154 MIL. L. REV. 113, 114 (1997).
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The power to establish federal enclaves within the states was granted to
Congress by the Constitution.138 Federal enclave jurisdiction was conceived of
by the Continental Congress in response to a soldier’s rebellion sparked by
non-payment of Revolutionary War wages in 1783.139 For four days, the
soldiers gathered outside the hall where Congress met and noisily, but without
violence, demanded their wages be paid.140 The Continental Congress
requested that Pennsylvania call up its militia to put an end to the gatherings,
but Pennsylvania refused to act in the absence of injury or property damage.141
The memory of what had occurred rankled with members of Congress and led
to the inclusion of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 in the Constitution.142 The
point of creating federal enclaves was “to protect federal activities by limiting
or completely excluding state authority on federal lands . . . .”143 Federal
legislative jurisdiction is essentially a property interest; that is, the jurisdiction
is based on the federal government’s acquisition of an interest in land.144 The
jurisdiction, and the legislative authority that accompanies it, is dependent on
the terms of the grant of land from the state to the federal government.145 The
three types of federal legislative jurisdiction are “exclusive, concurrent, and
partial.”146
Areas of exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction are known as enclaves.147
In enclaves, all legislative authority rests with the federal government.148 The
only power that the state retains on a federal enclave is “the right to serve
process resulting from activities or incidents which occurred off the land.”149
States usually do not have any power to enforce criminal laws on federal
enclaves.150 States are also limited in their authority to collect personal and
property taxes and to enforce civil laws.151 “Determining what law applies on

138. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17. The clause grants Congress the power “[t]o exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square)
as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the
Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.” Id.
139. Castlen & Block, supra note 137, at 114.
140. Id. at 119.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 120.
143. Id.
144. Castlen & Block, supra note 137, at 115.
145. Id. at 116.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Castlen & Block, supra note 137, at 116.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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enclaves is often confusing because it depends, in part, on how and when the
federal government received jurisdiction.”152 This confusion contributed to the
unwillingness of state court judges to provide the relief that is normally
available to domestic abuse victims under state law.
The other two types of federal legislative jurisdiction, concurrent and
partial, are characterized by some degree of nonexclusive federal control. The
second kind of federal legislative jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction, occurs
“where the state [has] reserved or obtained the right to exercise all legislative
authority concurrent with the federal government.”153 The civil and criminal
law of both the state and the federal government are applicable and both have
the right to exercise authority.154 The third kind of federal legislative
jurisdiction is partial legislative jurisdiction. “Partial legislative jurisdiction
applies to parcels of land where the state granted the federal government some
legislative authority, but the state reserved to itself the right to exercise other
authority in addition to the right to serve civil or criminal process.”155
The view of the courts until the 1950s was that federal enclave jurisdiction
excluded all state governmental power.156 For example, a Maryland court
found that residents of federal enclaves were not considered to be citizens of
the state in which the enclave was located.157 Because of this exclusion from
citizenship, “enclave residents were not entitled to [file for divorce,] receive
state education, vote, hold office, or receive any benefits derived from state
residency.”158
The 1953 Supreme Court case of Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking
Fund of Louisville began to temper this extreme view of federal enclave
jurisdiction.159 The Howard court permitted Louisville, Kentucky to levy an
earnings tax on the people who lived on a naval base.160 The Court stressed
the need for the competing jurisdictions to coexist comfortably:
The fiction of a state within a state can have no validity to prevent the state
from exercising its power over the federal area within its boundaries, so long
as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal
Government.
The sovereign rights in this dual relationship are not
antagonistic. Accommodation and cooperation are their aim. It is friction, not
fiction, to which we must give heed.161

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 117.
Castlen & Block, supra note 137, at 117.
Id.
Id. at 122.
Id. (citing Lowe v. Lowe, 133 A. 729 (Md. 1926)).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624 (1953).
Id. at 628.
Id. at 627.
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Since Howard, the judiciary has widened considerably the range of rights
available to enclave residents. Enclave residents have been allowed to vote in
the state in which the enclave is located since 1970.162 Federal courts have
also allowed residents of federal enclaves to hold local political offices and
receive local public assistance.163
Of particular interest in the domestic violence context is Cobb v. Cobb, a
case decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.164 The Cobb court
held that the fact that a female service member lived and worked on a military
base did not preclude her from obtaining a protective order against her abusive
husband under Massachusetts law.165 The court further held that the order
would be in force and enforceable on the military base.166 The issues were
moot by the time they reached the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
because the order had been issued and had expired by its own terms, and there
was no evidence or allegation that the husband had violated the order while it
was in effect.167 The judge who issued the protective order, apparently
concerned about his authority to do so, certified two questions to the Supreme
Judicial Court on the day the order was issued.168 The court decided to answer
the questions despite the fact that the case was moot because “the issue was of
162. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 426 (1970).
163. Castlen & Block, supra note 137, at 123.
164. Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (Mass. 1989). The U.S. Army and the Department of
Justice, among others, submitted amici curiae briefs on behalf of plaintiff Diane Cobb. Id. The
Army and the Justice Department were willing to invoke the power and protection of the state to
prevent abuse of a service member by her civilian husband. Id. at 1163. It seems logical to
assume that these protections should cut both ways and offer the protections of restraining orders
to civilian wives of military husbands. Yet there is no case law on the issue, and the Army’s
desire to handle cases of domestic violence perpetrated by soldiers internally was much discussed
in the wake of the killings at Fort Bragg. Even in its support of Diane Cobb, however, the
Army’s brief was careful to note that in its opinion, the Howard line of cases does not make it
clear that the Supreme Court meant to overrule all aspects of previous enclave precedent. Id. at
1163 n.4. The Army’s position is that “absent a contrary Federal law, a State law adopted after
the cession of the land would apply in an enclave if that subsequent regulatory scheme was
consistent with the ‘basic state law’ in effect at the time the land was ceded.” Id. The law
invoked by the plaintiff happened to be similar to laws in effect at the time the land was ceded to
Fort Devens. Id.
165. Id. at 1164.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1162.
168. Id. The questions were as follows:
1. Is this Court precluded from issuing a restraining order under the provisions of G.L. c.
209A barring the defendant James Cobb from approaching, contacting, or abusing the
plaintiff Diane Cobb solely because the plaintiff Diane Cobb is a member of the United
States Armed Forces who resides and works at Fort Devens? 2. If this Court is not
precluded from issuing such an order, is the order legally effective within the confines of
Fort Devens, where the plaintiff resides and works?
Id. at 1162 n.1.
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public importance, was likely to arise again, and was not likely to be capable
of appellate review before the recurring question would again be moot.”169
The issuing judge had indicated in his certification that the question of whether
persons living on Fort Devens could obtain relief under the state’s protection
order laws was one that arose frequently.170 The judge had also indicated that
his issuance of the order was in accord with recent changes in United States
Supreme Court policy “moving away from the view that this court expressed
years ago that, barring a statute to the contrary, State law does not apply in
lands ceded to the Federal Government.”171
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court construed the issue as:
[W]hether this court should now abandon (indeed must abandon) its earlier
view [that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction in areas that were
ceded to it, so as to bar the operation of state law] in favor of the United States
Supreme Court’s more recent controlling interpretation of the Constitution of
the United States.172

The court then reviewed the Howard line of cases173 and concluded that the
Supreme Court of the United States has “shown that the Constitution of the
United States does not bar extension of the benefits and burdens of all State
laws to inhabitants of land ceded to the Federal Government.”174 The court
found that there was no evidence that enforcing the order on the military base
would interfere with any federal function.175 The court also noted that,
according to the briefs submitted, there was no alternative to the Massachusetts
law available on the military base, and the military had even encouraged the
use of state law in such cases.176
The Cobb court indicated that its holding was compelled by the line of
Supreme Court cases that had extended the benefit of state laws to residents of
federal enclaves located within the state.177 Under the Cobb approach, a
federal enclave resident would be treated as a resident of the state for purposes
of obtaining and enforcing a protective order as long as the state had laws
governing the issuance of protective orders at the time the land was ceded to
the federal government.178 This approach would negate the problem of

169. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d at 1162.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See discussion supra notes 139–53 and accompanying text.
174. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d at 1163.
175. Id. at 1164.
176. Id. at 1164 n.5.
177. Id. at 1163.
178. This approach could cause obvious problems, given the uncertainty often surrounding
how and when a particular tract of land became part of a federal enclave. See Castlen & Block,
supra note 137, at 125.
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competing jurisdictions by making a valid order enforceable both on and off
the military base. The lack of case law about the issuance and enforcement of
protective orders on military bases from other states could indicate that other
state courts chose not to follow the precedent from Massachusetts.179
The Cobb approach negated the problem of state versus federal
jurisdiction, but the decision was not widely followed. Advocates who
approved of the way Cobb was decided encouraged Congress to enact
legislation that would afford state law protections to residents of military
bases.180 After the decision in Cobb, access to state law protections became
even more important. Passage of the VAWA meant that a woman who had
received a qualifying protective order from a state court could invoke the
protection of federal anti-domestic violence laws. Residents in military
communities, however, were still denied these protections.
More than a decade after Cobb and nearly ten years after the passage of the
VAWA, Congress finally responded to the needs of domestic violence victims
on military bases. The Armed Forces Domestic Security Act181 provides that
an order of protection issued by a civilian court has the same legal force and
effect on a military installation as it has in the jurisdiction of the issuing
court.182 The statute applies to both service members and civilians who are
present on the base.183
179. See id. at 130-31 (discussing Cobb and opining that “issues of enforcement of state court
orders against soldiers may rarely arise because those courts, afraid of stepping beyond their
jurisdiction, might hesitate to issue such orders.”)
180. Michael J. Malinowski, Note, Federal Enclaves and Local Law: Carving Out a
Domestic Violence Exception to Exclusive Federal Enclave Jurisdiction, 100 YALE L.J. 189
(1990). Other writers had suggested the retrocession of unnecessary jurisdiction over domestic
relations to the state as a possible solution. See Castlen & Block, supra note 137 passim.
181. Armed Forces Domestic Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-311, § 2, 116 Stat. 2455
(2002) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.A. § 1561a (West Supp. 2003)). The text of the statute
reads as follows:
(a) Force and effect.—A civilian order of protection shall have the same force and
effect on a military installation as such order has within the jurisdiction of the
court that issued such order.
(b) Civilian order of protection defined.—In this section, the term ‘civilian order of
protection’ has the meaning given the term ‘protection order’ in section 2266(5) of
title 18.
(c) Regulations.—The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to carry out
this section. The regulations shall be designed to further good order and discipline
by members of the armed forces and civilians present on military installations.
Id.
182. Id. The definition of protective order referred to in the statute is a reference to the
definition of a protective order contained in VAWA:
The term “protective order” includes any injunction or other order issued for the purpose
of preventing violent or threatening acts or harassment against, or contact or
communication with or physical proximity to, another person, including any temporary or
final order issued by a civil and criminal court (other than a support or child custody order
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This legislation is immensely important to victims of domestic violence in
military communities. A woman who lives or works on a military base and
obtains an order of protection from a state court now derives the same benefit
any other woman would derive from the order even though she is technically
crossing a jurisdictional line by living or working on a military base. The
VAWA “makes an essential step toward providing more extensive protection
for victims of domestic violence.”184 Federal legislation now “recognizes that
domestic violence is a national problem that crosses state lines.”185 This
recognition is no less true when the line that is crossed is the line between a
state and a federal enclave. The risk of serious violence often increases if the
abused partner threatens or attempts to leave the relationship, making it
necessary for the fleeing partner to be assured of legal protection wherever she
goes.186 This new legislation signals an attempt by Congress to ensure that one
of the original goals of the VAWA—that all women who are subjected to
violence by their partners should have the benefit of a validly-issued protective
order—is met.
Formerly, a victim of domestic violence fleeing a federal enclave faced a
dangerous situation. Issuance of a protective order subject to full faith and
credit requires notice to satisfy the due process rights of the respondent.187
“For the woman who has fled her attacker, this notification could prove
deadly.”188 The victim of domestic violence who flees a federal enclave
previously faced a difficult choice between giving up the protections of an
order altogether or revealing her whereabouts to her abuser. Putting the victim
in this position is manifestly unfair. It is precisely this sort of untenable choice
that the Full Faith and Credit provision of the VAWA sought to alleviate.189

issued pursuant to State divorce and child custody laws, except to the extent that such an
order is entitled to full faith and credit under other Federal law) whether obtained by filing
an independent order or as a pendente lite order in another proceeding so long as any civil
order was issued in response to a complaint, petition, or motion filed by or on behalf of a
person seeking protection.
18 U.S.C. § 2266(5) (2000).
183. Armed Forces Domestic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-311, § 2(a), 116 Stat. 2455
(2002) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.A. § 1561a (West Supp. 2003)).
184. Klein, supra note 33, at 269-70.
185. Id. at 270.
186. Klein & Orloff, supra note 7, at 816. Studies conducted in Chicago and Philadelphia
found that 25% of women who were killed by male partners were either separated or divorced
from their abusers, and a further 29% were killed during the process of being divorced or
separated. Id.
187. Klein, supra note 33, at 355.
188. Melissa L. Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandary: Challenges Facing Tribal Governments
in Implementing the Full Faith and Credit Provisions of the Violence Against Women Acts, 90
KY. L.J. 123, 131 (2002).
189. Id. at 130-31.
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Likewise, under the Armed Forces Domestic Security Act, a woman who
chooses to leave her abusive partner may now file for an order of protection in
a court of the state where the military installation is located.190 This order
would be issued in conformance with the state’s due process requirements and
would allow the respondent notice and the opportunity to be heard. The order
would then be enforceable on the military base while the victim made
preparations to leave, and this same order would be enforceable without a
further notice requirement in the jurisdiction to which the victim moved under
the VAWA’s full faith and credit provisions.191 The new law, in conjunction
with the VAWA, ensures that the woman who has successfully removed
herself from an abusive situation does not have to place herself in jeopardy by
revealing her location to the very person with whom she is seeking to avoid
contact. The new law also allows a woman who wishes to avail herself of the
domestic violence protections afforded by state law to do so without fear that
the protective order she obtains will be unenforceable in her home. In other
words, the new law affords a victim of abuse the opportunity to avoid the
military chain of command entirely by allowing her to go directly to the
civilian courts, thus negating the possibility of having to deal with an
unresponsive commander.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence should be commended for
its dedication and hard work. Because the Department of Defense has agreed
with the majority of the Task Force’s nearly 200 recommendations,192 there is
good reason to believe that much needed changes will occur in the way the
military handles domestic violence. Accepting these recommendations,
however, is just the beginning. In its final report, the Task Force expressed
concern about the fatalities at Fort Bragg and about continuing weaknesses and
room for improvement in provisions for domestic violence services at military
bases across the country.193 The Department of Defense has not yet reached
final decisions on several of the Task Force’s recommendations; particularly
those related to ensuring victim safety and the creation of new advocacy
positions on military installations. A combination of new laws such as the
Armed Forces Domestic Security Act and a complete reevaluation and
reconception of the role of the military in addressing domestic violence in
military communities is needed in order to ensure that all victims of domestic

190. See Pub. L. No. 107-311, § 2(a), 116 Stat. 2455 (2002) (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C.A. § 1561a (West Supp. 2003)).
191. See id.
192. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at vii.
193. Id. at v.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

SAFE AT HOME BASE?

303

violence in the military have access to effective assistance in ending the
violence in their lives.
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